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Abstract—Smart cards are an example of advanced chip
technology. They allow information transfer between the card
holder and the system over secure networks, but they contain
sensitive data related to both the card holder and the system,
that has to be kept private and conﬁdential. The objective of this
work is to create an executable model of a smart card system,
including the security protocols and transactions, and to examine
the strengths and determine the weaknesses by running tests
on the model. The security objectives have to be considered
during the early stages of systems development and design;
an executable model will give the designer the advantage of
exploring the vulnerabilities early, and therefore enhancing the
system security. The Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) 2.0 is
used to model the smart card security protocol. The executable
model is programmed in SystemC with the Transaction Level
Modeling (TLM) extensions. The ﬁnal model was used to examine
the effectiveness of a number of authentication mechanisms
with different probabilities of failure. In addition, a number of
probable attacks on the current security protocol were modeled
to examine the vulnerabilities. The executable model shows that
the smart card system security protocols and transactions need
further improvement to withstand different types of security
attacks.
Keywords—Smart Cards; Modelling Languages; SystemC;
Transaction Level Modelling
I. INTRODUCTION
In our digital era, smart cards are a central piece of the
wireless revolution. They have entered our wallets as a highly
secure key to services that are essential to our daily interaction
with the digital world. A smart card allows information trans-
fer between the card holder and a system over secure networks;
it contains sensitive data related to both the card holder and the
system that has to be kept private and conﬁdential. Therefore,
security has to be considered as a key requirement during the
early stages of systems development.
The objective of this work is to create an executable
model of a smart card system, including the security protocols
and transactions, to allow examination of the strengths and
weaknesses by executing tests on the model.
The Uniﬁed Modelling Language (UML) version 2.0 has
been widely used to model smart card security protocols. For
example, UMLsec [1] is an extension to UML for integrat-
ing security related information into UML speciﬁcations by
specifying security requirements through stereotypes, tagged
values, and constraints.
On the other hand, the models produced by UML are
static. In this work we have developed executable models
in SystemC, which is a set of C++ classes that provide an
event-driven simulation kernel. SystemC is a system level
modelling language; it enables design and veriﬁcation at
the system level, independent of any detailed hardware and
software implementation. On top of SystemC, Transaction
Level Modelling (TLM) is used to model the transactions of
the smart card system.
II. RELATED WORK
Security protocols are sets of rules designed to ensure par-
ticular security goals. However, designing and implementing
these protocols is difﬁcult and they may fail against various
attacks. To be able to effectively integrate the security pro-
tocols at early development stages, modelling languages and
techniques are used to better visualise the entire system. One
such modelling tool is Communicating Sequential Processes
(CSP), which is a process algebra that is used to describe
and analyse security properties and protocols by providing a
mathematical framework [2]. However, to be able to use CSP,
the designer must have specialised knowledge and training,
which limits the usage of this method. GSPML, [3], is a visual
security protocol modelling language. Again, this language
introduces notations and complex models that are targeted to
security specialists.
UML can model both the static structure and the dynamic
behaviour of the system [4]. To support UML for secure
systems development, an extension called UMLsec has been
proposed, [1], [5]. UMLsec uses a combination of use-case
driven processes with a goal directed approach. The three
main mechanisms of the extension are stereotypes, tags, and
constraints [6]. Stereotypes and tags are used to create and
present the security requirements and assumptions, constraints
may be attached but they should be satisﬁed by modelling
elements with the related stereotype [5]. An adversary can
be created in UMLsec to model possible threats to a system.
UMLsec was used to ﬁnd possible vulnerabilities in Common
Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations (CEPS) [1], it was also used
to deﬁne security permissions that enforce restrictions on the
workﬂows of a system [7].
None of the above modelling languages provides an au-
tomatic transition from design to code implementation. A
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637designer would like to have an executable model that allows
a better testing of the designed model and therefore links
the gap between the design phase and the code implantation
phase. In our work, an executable model is produced using
SystemC with the TLM extensions [8]. SystemC has been
used to produce a methodology to simulate security attacks on
smart cards with fault injection [9] and it has also been used
to create an environment for design veriﬁcation of smart cards
using security attack simulation [10]. In TLM, communication
among computation components is modelled by channels and
transaction requests go on by calling interface functions of
these channel models [11].
III. SMART CARD SYSTEM SECURITY
Because the smart cards are used to store sensitive data such
as PINs, passwords, and keys; the main purpose of an attack
is to get hold of these data. Attackers might perform various
numbers and styles of attacks on the smart card system.
A. Smart Card System Threats
Threats are the possible means by which a security policy
may be breached [12]. A threat source can be any person,
thing, event, or idea that poses danger to an asset within
a system in terms of conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability,
or legitimate use. Moreover, threats can be deliberate or
accidental [12]. If deliberate, a threat can be categorised as
passive, such as network snifﬁng, or active, such as negligence,
errors, attempt to gain unauthorised access to the system, or
changing the value of a particular transaction by malicious
persons. Therefore, possible threats on the smart card system
include unauthorised system access, hacking and system intru-
sion, information leakage or theft, integrity violation (errors
and omissions by insiders or outsiders), distributed denial of
service, illegitimate use (dishonest or disgruntled insiders or
outsiders), system penetration and tampering. Threat sources
have different motivations that may lead to carrying out
various attacks on any government or business information
system; therefore, the parties involved in the smart card system
must be familiar with the human threat environments and their
different motivations.
B. Possible Attacks on a Smart Card System
Security is a huge matter; it covers every single stage of
a products lifecycle, starting from the development stage, the
manufacturing stage, and ending up with actual usage. Attacks
that take place at the development stage and the manufacturing
stage of a smart card are most likely carried out by an insider,
[13] . Attacks during the smart card use stage can be physical
or logical [13]. Physical attacks may manipulate the semicon-
ductor itself and usually require equipment like microscopes,
focused ion beams, etc. [14]. Side-channel attacks consist of
observing behaviour while the information is being processed
and include timing analysis and power analysis [15].
In contrast, logical attacks or so called software attacks
do not attack the hardware properties directly; they are more
focused on the communication and ﬂow of information be-
tween the smart card and the terminal [13]. Attackers can
write malicious software, that can be employed in a software
attack on a smart card, for example, in smart cards that support
Java Card it is possible to load and run software. Examples
of logical attacks could be bug exploits, illegal bytecode, and
attacks during PIN comparison.
Other types of attacks take place during the authentication
phase of the smart card system, where the user identity is au-
thenticated using different types of authentication mechanisms
like biometrics [16].
IV. USING UML TO MODEL SMART CARD
TRANSACTIONS
A robust and secure smart card system requires an opti-
mal selection of policies, procedures, protocols, architecture,
technology, and staff. To have a better idea of the smart card
system and its components, operations, applications, data and
information, and security mechanisms, we use a number of
UML diagrams for illustration.
A. Overview of a Smart Card System
Figure 1 is a use case diagram that gives an overview of the
basic components and functions of any smart card system. The
use case diagram is a behavioural UML diagram that presents
the system functionality. In our system, the actors illustrated
in the ﬁgure represent the main components of the system,
which are the User, Smart Card, Smart Card Reader, Client,
Server, and Database. The use cases represent the functions
or services that take place while the system is operating. The
focus of the analysis in this study will be on the functions of
three main components, which are the User, Smart Card, and
the Smart Card Reader.
When the User decides to use the Smart Card, the ﬁrst step
is to insert the Smart Card in the Smart Card Reader. The
Smart Card Reader has number of jobs: it has to verify and
authenticate the User and Smart Card, commit transactions,
and exchange and conﬁrm the User details with the other
system components. To be able to demonstrate the transactions
of the system, another type of UML diagram has to be used.
The following sections describe the registration phase and the
veriﬁcation phase of the smart card system.
B. Smart Card Registration System
To be able to demonstrate the transactions and message
sequence between the smart card system objects, a sequence
diagram is used; it is a behavioural diagram that shows the
interactions of system processes.
Figure 2 shows the enrolment process that is the main part
of the Registration System. The model uses a combination of
PINs and biometrics to enhance the veriﬁcation process. In
addition, the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is employed to
fulﬁl the system security requirements. PKI is considered to be
one of the most comprehensive and secure schemes of passing
information from one point to the other. It uses a trusted third
party for implementing key life-cycle management processes.
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This third party is called the Certiﬁcate Authority (CA), which
validates the identity of the user and issues digital certiﬁcates
[17].
The User provides the required information along with the
biometric evidence. The system then saves the User details
in the Smart Card and captures the ﬁngerprint, which is the
biometric method used in the proposed design, and produces
a template that is stored in the system and the Smart Card.
Then, the Registration System requests a PIN from the User
to be used in future veriﬁcation processes.
The PIN is stored in the Smart Card for future veriﬁcation.
Finally, the smart card system requests a private key from
the CA to generate a digital signature. The CA, on the other
hand, requests User veriﬁcation from the Registration System,
generates a pair of keys for the User. The CA also issues a
digital certiﬁcate corresponding to the public key, and sends
the private key to the Smart Card to generate a digital signature
that combines the private key and the biometric template of
the User.
C. Smart Card System Veriﬁcation
Figure 3 shows the transactions that take place when the
User uses the Smart Card in a security environment that
combines PIN, Biometrics, and PKI security methods.
The User ﬁrst inserts the PIN, the Smart Card Reader
extracts the stored PIN from the Smart Card and starts the
comparison process. If the match is successful the Smart
Card Reader will ask for another proof, which is the Users
ﬁngerprint, otherwise, the transaction will be aborted after
allowing the User three attempts to enter the PIN. The User
scans the ﬁnger through the Smart Card Reader scanner; the
Reader will extract the User’s biometric feature and produce
a template. The matching process will then take place and
the result will decide whether the User has the permission to
access the system or not. If the match was true, the Smart Card
releases the User’s private key. Next, the User starts to send a
message to the Receiver; the message is going to be digitally
signed with the User’s private key, and the system will request
the Receiver’s public key from the CA to encrypt the message.
The CA will send the digital certiﬁcate and the message will be
encrypted using both the User’s private key and the Receiver’s
pubic key, therefore, the digital envelope is now ready to be
sent securely to the Receiver. Finally, the Receiver will send
a request to the CA to get the Sender’s public key to decrypt
the message. Again, using both the Sender’s public key and
the Receiver’s private key the Receiver will be able to decrypt
the message successfully.
These security methods should achieve the security goals of
conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.
However, each mechanism has its pros and cons, the possible
attacks that might take place are shown in Figure 3. For
example, ﬁngerprints have disadvantages: How can we know
that the biometric provided is not subject to misuse? If the
User was clever and powerful enough to fool the system and
use a false ﬁngerprint, then the system will be breached and
an intruder will have access to the real User’s credentials and
privileges. The PKI method has its disadvantages as well. If
one breach takes place during the transaction the Sender and
the Receiver can both suffer security loss.
D. Modelling Attacks Using UMLsec
After using UML diagrams to express the smart card system
protocol and processes, and to represent the transactions
that take place while messages are exchanged during the
registration and veriﬁcation processes, in addition to knowing
where are the areas that could be vulnerable to attacks, it
is also essential to test the model against possible attacks.
UMLsec was used to model attacks, using stereotypes such as
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secrecy and secure information ﬂow along with their tags and
constraints. An adversary type in UMLsec can have a function
called Threat that allows the adversary to commit delete, read,
and insert attacks. Even by writing these notations down, the
model is still static and not executable.
As a result, UMLsec did not automate the model because
it is a speciﬁcation language that has the ability of expressing
the system protocols and transactions but not automating them.
Therefore, SystemC TLM was used to transform the static
model into an executable model.
V. ANIMATING THE MODEL USING SYSTEMC TLM
The SystemC library provides concurrent and hierarchical
modules, ports, channels, processes, and clocks. Large designs
are always broken down hierarchically to be able to manage
complexity, structural decomposition of the simulated model
in SystemC is speciﬁed with modules. The module is the
smallest container with state, behaviour, and structure for
hierarchical connectivity, the construct SC MODULE is used
to represent a module [8]. In our work, SC THREAD is
used – a thread process is associated with its own thread of
execution. Once the thread starts executing it is in complete
control of the simulation until it chooses to return control to
the simulator. Hence, the thread process is used to model
sequential behaviour [8]. SystemC has two ways to pass
control to the simulator again, one way is to exit by (return),
in this case the thread is totally stopped, the other way is by
having a (wait), therefore, every thread contains an inﬁnite
loop and usually has at least one wait function.
In our model, the smart card system objects are programmed
as SystemC modules, and the transactions among these mod-
ules are modelled using TLM. In TLM, transactions are
implemented by function calls.
A. Smart Card System Simulation
The executable model produced in our work shows the
sequence of transactions that occur in the smart card system
while the smart card is used; they correspond to the trans-
actions in Figure 3. The following is part of the simulation
output produced:
sender_object://///////////////////////
sender_object:// Card count: 100
sender_object:// Card ID: 611
sender_object:// Pin entered: correct
sender_object:// entry duration: 1 s
sender_object://///////////////////////
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sender_object: begin transition 1
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 2
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 2
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 3
smartcard_reader_object: Good pin
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 3
sender_object: end transition 1
sender_object: *** good pin decoded ***
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 4
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 4
sender_object://///////////////////////
sender_object:// Card count: 100
sender_object:// Card ID: 611
sender_object:// Fingerprint entered: correct
sender_object:// Entry duration: 5 s
sender_object://///////////////////////
sender_object: begin transition 5
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 6
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 6
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 7
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 7
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 8
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 8
sender_object: end transition 5
smartcard_object: begin transition 9
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 10
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 10
smartcard_object: end transition 9
sender_object: begin transition 11
sender_object: end transition 11
smartcard_object: begin transition 12
smartcard_object: end transition 12
smartcard_object: begin transition 13
smartcard_object: end transition 13
cert_authority_object: begin transition 14
cert_authority_object: end transition 14
smartcard_object: begin transition 15
smartcard_object: end transition 15
smartcard_object: begin transition 16
smartcard_object: end transition 16
receiver_object: begin transition 17
receiver_object: end transition 17
cert_authority_object: begin transition 18
cert_authority_object: end transition 18
receiver_object: begin transition 19
receiver_object: end transition 19
641The executable module shows the smart card system objects
and their related transactions. The lifelines in the UML dia-
gram are represented as objects, called modules in SystemC,
and the arrows are represented as transactions using TLM. The
transitions in the output correspond to the transaction number
in the UML diagram. Obviously, the designer can observe the
attempts to enter the right PIN and Biometric along with the
required timing. This allows the testing of the effectiveness of
the authentication methods used. By running the simulation on
different numbers of smart cards with different probabilities
of failure it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of each
authentication method.
B. Simulating Attacks on Smart Card System
The executable model allows us to simulate an attack on
the system. An attack on any part of the system is essentially
another transaction inserted into the model. For example, to
simulate an attack that allows the attacker to steal the private
key released from the smart card object, which is coded as a
state machine, an attacker is implemented as a class that can
intrude into multiple modules in a thread-safe manner. Thus,
a transaction is effectively inserted into the model by inserting




Now, the model waits for transitions 1 to 8 to occur, and then
the attacker interferes and attacks the system after transition
8 where the private key is released.
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 8
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 8
sender_object: end transition 5
Attacker initialized, @104 s
Attacker stole the private key, @104 s
smartcard_object: begin transition 9
smartcard_object: end transition 9
The simulation shows that the attacker gets hold of the private
key by practising a successful attack on the smart card object.
Attacking the key exchange operation violates the privacy,
authentication, and integrity properties of the system. Also,
it compromises the security of the User, which may result
in identity theft, information leackage, or message alteration.
Being able to steal the private key points out a vulnerability
within the security protocol employed in the system.
A Denial of Service (DOS) attack is simulated using the
same model. The attack aims at violating the availability
property of the system security. The DOS attack will take place
against the Certiﬁcate Authority server; the attacker attempts to
exhaust the server, which will result in the server being unable
to provide the services for legitimate users. The following is
part of the DOS attack simulation output:










Attacker stole the sender public key,
SERVICE DENIED, @2 s 561
As the output shows, the transactions of the smart card
system are running normally, however, when the DOS attack
successfully takes place, the service is denied and the attacker
gets hold of the users public keys exchanged among the system
objects. In addition, the subsequent transactions failed to occur
because the Certiﬁcate Authority server is unavailable. This
attack shows that the availability property has been violated
and the system users will not be able to use their smart cards
until the Certiﬁcate Authority server recovers from the attack.
In summary, the executable model developed using SystemC
TLM allowed the designer to discover the weak points of the
system, the successful attacks indicate that there are weak-
nesses in the security protocol. A number of security properties
like authentication, privacy, integrity, and availability have
been violated, which shows that the system is vulnerable to
attacks. To be able to reduce the probability of successful
attacks, the designer can modify the executable model to test
against future attacks.
In contrast with the UML diagram, the animation makes it
possible to see the attack actually happening. Moreover, it is
possible to make changes easily within the model and to try
a number of attacks to test the system’s robustness by simply
inserting transactions into the UML diagram, and transforming
them into transactions within the SystemC TLM executable
model.
VI. CONCLUSION
UML diagrams are an excellent way of modelling systems,
along with their extensions; they have features that show the
designer how things should work. However, UML does not
allow the designer to see what happens if something goes
wrong with the system. Therefore, to be able to see things
happening and give reasons about the system, simulation has
to take place. SystemC TLM was used to transform a static
UML model into an executable model. The executable model
providing the opportunity to see the transaction ﬂow within the
system objects in an animated manner. In addition, it allowed
the simulation of attacks in different parts of the system. The
model gives a clear view of the weaknesses in the security
requirements, methods, and protocols used in the smart card
system.
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